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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DICK BASTIAN and PHILLIP
TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
CEDAR HILLS INVESTMENT AND LAND
CO., a partnership, ASSOCIATED
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPERS, a
California corporation, and
NEAR EAST TECHNOLOGICAL
SERVICES, LIMITED, a California
corporation,
Defendants and
Respondents.

Case No. 16941

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by plaintiffs for specific performance of two land sale contracts entered into with
the defendants or, in the alternative, for damages for breach
of two real estate contracts entered into by the plaintiff,
Dick Bastian, and Gary Carson.

At the time of the trial,

plaintiff, Phillip Taylor, was joined as a party of plaintiff
on stipulated record (Rec. 259:1-27, Rec. 94-95).

During the

trial, the claim for specific performance of the contracts was
withdrawn by the plaintiffs on stipulation with the defendants
and the plaintiffs proceeded upon their claim for damages
breach of the two real estate contracts.

fo~

Subsequent to the
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execution of the earnest money receipts and offers to purchase
and the acceptance by the defendants, the parties entered into
an amended agreement to the contracts (Rec. 359-360) and agreed
to a closing date of February 17, 1978 at Rocky Mountain Title
Co. in Orem, Utah (Rec. 362).
of the transaction.

The parties met for the closing

The closing never took place and plaintiffs

brought this action for damages.
DISPOSITIQN IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury on the 27th and
28th days of -August, 1979 and the 8th day of November, 1979
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs.

On the 6th day of February,

1980, the trial court made Findings and entered Judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for the sum
of $35,000.00, together with eight percent (8%) interest per
annum with no award for attorney's fees or costs to either
party.

The plaintiffs appeal the decision of the trial court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek to have the Supreme Court rule that

on the Findings made by the trial court and on the undisputed
facts, plaintiffs are entitled to entry of judgment in the
amount of $291,586.40, attorney's fees in the amount of
$9,478.00 and costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cedar Hills Development Company is a partnership
comprised of Near East Technological Services, Limited, a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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California corporation, and Associated Industrial Developers,
a California corporation, all parties being defendants.
Reed Nixon, Robert Nixon and Mark Nixon are agents
of Cedar Hills Development Company in the development of the
Cedar Hills properties.

They also have their own corporation

called Wincor Development Company, a Utah corporation.
William A. Malis and George C. Drivas are agents
for Cedar Hills Development Company (Rec. 278:16-22; 306:16-21).
Dick E. Bastian is a real estate developer.

Gary

Carson is a real estate contractor and developer.
Prior to suit, Phillip Taylor became a party to the
transactions by purchasing a part of the interest of Dick
Bastian and all of the interest of Noall Tanner.

Dick Bastian

purchased the interest of Gary Carson prior to trial.

Phillip

Taylor was joined as a party plaintiff at time of trial, having
acquired an interest in the properties

(Rec. 259:1-9).

Gary Carson was dismissed out as a party plaintiff
during the trial.

At trial, Dick E. Bastian and Phillip

Taylor held all buyers' interests.
Cedar Hills Development Company and its predecessor
in interest, Associated Industrial Developers, Inc. had commenced development of the Cedar Hills property prior to the
formation and the incorporation of the Town of Cedar Hills.
Sewage lagoons had been constructed to meet health department
requirements on the property of Cedar Hills Development Company.
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Thereafter, the town was formed with Robert Nixon, one of the
agents given power of attorney by Cedar Hills Development
Company, becoming its first mayor.

Richard LaFrance, the sales

agent working for Global Enterprises and Associates, became one
of the councilman on the initial town council.

At the time of

the formation of the town, the area of the Cedar Hills Development Company property, which included the sewage lagoons constructed by the private company, were not annexed into the
town and were not transferred eith by ownership, control, or
by lease to the town.

The testimony of the attorney, Brian

Harrison, attorney for Gedar Hills, shows that the lagoons
belonged to and were the private property of the Cedar Hills
Development Company (Rec. 423:27-30).

The town had prepared

a lease of the lagoon property to put control within the town
but no lease had ever been signed (Rec. 424:5-22).

The town

had made demands upon the development company to transfer
ownership or control of the lagoons but the lease has never
been signed to the time of trial, nor has any transfer been
made of the ownership or operation of the lagoons (Rec. 424:23-30;
425) and the company refuses to execute the lease (Rec. 425:1-11).
On November 15, 1977, Dick E. Bastian and Gary L.
Carson entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase for the purchase of 105 acres of development ground
from Cedar Hills Development Company (Rec. 288, Ex. 9) for a
purchase price of $1,417,500.00 and upon the execution of the
earnest money receipt and of fer to purchase made payments of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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$25,000.00 upon the purchase price.

The payment was delivered

to Global Enterprises and Associates, the sellers realty
agent.
On November 16, 1977, Dick E. Bastian and Gary L.
Carson entered into another Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase from Cedar Hills Development Company for the purchase of 37.75 acres of development land in Plat ''C" of Cedar
Hills for the purchase price of-$517,175.00 and made payment
upon said purchase in the
Ex. 10).

~um

of $10,000.00 (Rec. 289:20-29,

The earnest money was again delivered to Global

Enterprises and Associates.
On November 23, William Malis, acting in behalf of
Cedar Hills Development Company, sent a demand letter to Global
Enterprises and Associates for delivery of the $35,000.00
earnest money deposits and the demand letter alluded to the
fact that there were contingencies that were not met.

Cedar

Hills Development Company then committed the indemnification
of Global Enterprises and Associates, the realty company, regarding the payment of the funds on over to Cedar Hills Development Company

(Ex. 12).

Upon demand, the real estate broker

delivered the $35,000.00 to the agents of Cedar Hills Development Company, S. Reed Nixon, Mark Nixon and Robert Nixon, who
had been appointed agents for the development of the property,
which is the subject matter of this lawsuit.

Their authority

was recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office and is shown
as Exhibit 5 in the Record.

(Rec.

285:7-15, testimony of Mr. Malis)
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The Earnest Money Receipts and Offer to Purchase
were contingent upon the parties cooperatively obtaining the
annexation of the property into the Town of Cedar Hills and
approval of the preliminary plat.

Annexation was accomplished

in December of 1977 and the preliminary plat approval was obtained on January 4, 1978

(Rec. 358:3-5).

The Earnest Money

Agreement and Of fer to Purchase for the 105 acres provided that
30 days after annexation buyers would pay an additional $175,000.00
and upon such payment sellers would release and provide good
and marketable title tq 13 acres to the buyers.

The contract

further provided that the sellers would provide sufficient
culinary water supply and use of the sewage lagoons for 30
homes.

The balance of the payments under the contract would

be in accordance with the written agreement.
The Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase for
the 37.75 acres in Plat "C" provided that buyers would pay
$40,000 within 30 days of annexation and approval of the preliminary plat.

It further provided that sellers would provide

sufficient culinary water supply and the use of the sewage
lagoon system for 12 homes.

It also provided that upon pay-

ment of the $40,000.00 sellers were to provide title to 3 acres
and release the remaining acreage upon payment of the balance
of the contract price according to its terms

(Ex. 10).

Sometime in January or February of 1978, the parties
entered into an Amendment Agreement

(Ex. 14), and set February
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17, 1978 as the closing date for the payment of the amounts
due at that time and the delivery of title to the 13 acres and
3 acres, respectively (Rec. 362:11-22, 348:18-24; 509:18-25).
The contracts and Amendment Agreement required the
sellers to provide the transfer of certain shares of Manila
Water Company stock to the Town of Cedar Hills, to provide a
sufficient amount of water to the Town of Cedar Hills and to
insure the development of the buyers project for the entire
142.75 acres being conveyed.

The Amendment Agreement further

provided that Cedar Hills Development Company would dedicate
to the Town of Cedar Hills an access to the property being
released at the time of the first release and payment of the
$215,000.00 under both contracts, so as to insure access to
the buyers for the first properties that they were going to
develop.

At closing, the contracts also required conveyance

of good and marketable title to the 16 acres at the same time
as the payment of the $215,000.00.
Between the approval of the preliminary plat and the
closing, the parties discovered that the State Health Department
had put a limit on the amount of connections that could be made
to the defendants' sewage lagoons and that the lagoons had not
been transferred to the Town of Cedar Hills.

Defendants,

through their agent, George Drivas, and plaintiffs met at the
office of Rocky Mountain Title Company on February 17, 1978
for the ostensible purpose of closing the transaction, conveying the 13 and 3 acres, respectively, and making payment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the $175,000.00 and $40,000.00, respectively.

At the time of

closing, plaintif£s discovered that the defendants did not
have title to the properties to be conveyed, had mortgages
upon the properties, had not transferred the culinary water to
the town 0£ Cedar Hills as required by the Amendment Agreement
and were not in the position to close.

At closing, no documents

were prepared for the conveyance of the 13 and 3 acres, respectively, or for the release of the underlying obligations
owed by the defendants.
At the time of the closing meeting, a dispute
arose over sewa0e hookups.

The plaintiffs demanded the defen-

dants give approval to the use of the sewage lagoons for 30 and
12 hookups, respectively (Rec. 548:18-27).

The defendants

previously assured the plaintiffs that such would be provided,
but at the time of the closing, refused to sign authorization
for the use of the sewage lagoons.
At the time of the closing meeting, the sales agent,
Richard LaFrance acting for the sellers on the project, arrived
at the closing meeting with a letter from the State Health
Department authorizing the increase in the number of the
sewage lagoon hookups sufficient to meet the needs of the
plaintiffs herein (Ex. 15).

Despite such authorization, the

defendants' agent, George C.

Drivas, refused to give the

authorization for the use of the sewage lagoons.
At the time of the closing, the defendants were not
prepared nor ready to deliver a good and marketable title to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the premises required to be delivered at the time of closing.
The plaintiffs had the funds available to make the
payments due, amounting to $215,000.00, as required under the
Earnest Money Receipts and Off er to Purchase and Amendment
Agreement.

The defendants did not convey water rights to the

town as required by the Amendment Agreement (Ex. 15) nor deliver title to 16 acres as required by the contracts.

The

plaintiffs did not tender the money to the defendants because
the defendants were not in· the position to deliver the necessary title to the plaintiffs.

Even if the plaintiffs had

tendered the amount.required, because of title defects, lack of
title in the defendants and encumbrances on the properties,
plaintiffs could not have obtained that for which they had
contracted.
The realtor attempted to get the parties together
for an additional closing and to get the matter resolved (Ex. 27).
The plaintiffs attempted to enter into a compromise regarding
the 42 hookups to the sewage lagoon and to set an additional
closing meeting within 10 days and offered their full performance of the contracts.

(Ex. 42)

At the time of the closing meeting, the evidence
showed that the buyers had in excess of $400,000.00 on hand,
which was more than was needed to meet the $215,000.00 in
payments under the contract.
At the time of the closing date of February 17, 1978
the property had an appraised value of $2,212,000.00, the
purchase price to plaintiffs was $1,934,675.00, and the difSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ference between market and purchase price was $277,325.00.
The plaintiffs had paid $35,000.00 to the defendants as earnest
money (Rec. 560:21-26).

They had paid engineering costs of

$11,761.40 (Rec. 555:6-19) and had paid an annexation fee of
$2,500.00 (Rec. 563:8-13).

The parties stipulated that if

either party was entitled to attorney's fees that $9,478.00
costs would be a reasonable amount.

(Rec. 648:7-15)

All representations of the sellers to the buyers up
to the closing meeting were made through their agents, the
realtors.

The realtors drafted all agreements except for the

Amendment Agr·eement dr!=:tfted by William A. Malis, the agent
and attorney of the defendants, Cedar Hills Development
Company.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS
WERE NOT READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO COMPLETE THE TRANSACTION
AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTS
The contracts between the parties are comprised of:
(a)
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 11/15/77, (Ex. 9, Rec. 289:7-9)
for purchase of 105 acres.
{b)
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated 11/16/77, for the purchase of
37.75 acres (Ex. 10, Rec. 290:19-21).
(c) Amendment Agreement applying to both
Earnest Money Receipts, undated (Ex. 14,
Rec. 3 00: 8-1 O) •
(d)
The oral agreement fixing the closing date
for payment of the $175,000.00 (Ex. 9) and
$40,000.00 (Ex. 10) set for February 17, 1978
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at Rocky Mountain Title Company (Rec. 541:5-10;
397:9-20; 417:3-18).
A careful analysis of the component parts of the
contracts shows that the buyers were required under the
contracts and as a condition of the purchase:
(a)
To obtain annexation of the
into the town of Cedar Hills.

~roperties

(b)
To obtain preliminary plat approval on
the development within 90 days of the execution
of the agreement. Annexation was accomplished
in December, 1977 by the buyers (_Rec. 331:6-8;
Ex. 3, testimony of Reed Nixon) and the preliminary plat approval was obtained on January
4 , 19 7 8 (Ex . 14 and 41 ) .
(c)
Payment of $175,000.00 on Exhibit 9 and
$40,600.00 on Exhibit 10 at time of closing.
(d)
Payment of installments pursuant to the
tenns of the Amendment Agreement commencing
October 4, 1978.
The contracts required of the sellers:
(a)
Sufficient culinary water for the entire
project, acreage of 142.75 acres.
(b)
Use of the lagoon systems for 30 homes
(Ex. 9) and for 12 homes {Ex. 10). Use of
lagoon system was to be furnished at the time
of the closing.
(c)
Conveyance of clear title to 13 acres at
time of the payment of the $175,000.00 on
Exhibit 9.
(d)
Conveyance of clear title to 3 acres from
the property covered by Exhibit 10 to be conveyed at the time of the payment of $40,000.00.
{e)
Transfer of the shares of water in Manila
Water Company to the town of Cedar Hills pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Amendment Agreement
to the earnest money agreements (Ex. 14).
Dedication to the town of Cedar Hills of
certain real property for necessary access to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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buyers' first release pursuant to paragraph 3
of the Amendment Agreement (Ex. 14).
(f)
Good and marketable title to the 16 acres
to be conveyed at time of closing.
In the Findings entered by the trial court, the trial
court held in Finding No. 1 that neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendants were ready, willing and able to complete the transaction as provided in the Option Agreements and Amendment.
A careful examination of the trial court's Findings indicates
the only alleged failure on

t~e

part of the plaintiffs was the

failure to tender the $215,000.00 required to be paid at the
closing as agreed in the contracts.
The trial court found in Finding No.

4 that plaintiffs

had the funds to make the payment but failed to tender such
payment.
In Finding No. 6, the trial court held that the
defendants were not in a position to deliver the necessary
title to the plaintiffs even if the plaintiffs had tendered
the amounts required.
The trial court made no Findings of any failure on
the part of the plaintiffs of their performance on the contracts
except for the failure to tender the monies they had available
at the time of the meeting set by the parties at Rocky Mountain
Title Company for the closing of the transaction.

The trial

court was in error in ruling that such failure to tender was a
breach of contract by plaintiffs because Finding No.

6 makes

it obvious that tender was a useless act, when the trial court
held, "Defendant was not in position to deliver the necessary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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titles to the plaintiff"

(Rec. 108).

Defendants were not in a

position to close the transaction because of defects in title
and sellers' lack of preparedness to close.

This Court has

consistently held that a trial court should not require the
parties to do a useless act.

However, aside froJn the obvious

inconsistency in holding that the plaintiffs had defaulted
under the contract for failure to make a tender, and then
also holding that even if the tender had been made that the
defendants were not in a position to deliver title, the trial
court has ignored the decision of this Court in Huck vs. Hayes,
560 P.2d 1124

(1977~.

The facts in Huck vs. Hayes are remarkably similar
to the facts in the case now

b~fore

the Court.

In that case,

the contract required the defendant to furnish good and marketable title with the title insurance policy in the plaintiff's
name.

The day before the closing set by the parties, the

preliminary title report showed that the property was in the
name of Kirschbaum and not Hayes, the seller.

It showed that

there was a federal tax lien against the property and also
made exceptions for two previous warranties for failure to
state marital status or disclose what interest the defendant
had in the property.
for March 8, 1974.

A closing date was set by the parties
The Court found that on that date the

plaintiff-buyer had sufficient funds to make the payment
required by the agreement.

It further found that the buyers

did not offer to make the payment.

There was a period of
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time when the realtor was trying to get the parties together
for closing and then the defendant-seller took the position
that because the buyers had not made payment required by the
contract on the closing date, the seller had no further obligations under the contract.

Those statements of fact in Huck

vs. Hayes are almost identical to the facts present in the
case now before the Court.
earnest money contracts

The parties entered into two

(Exs. 9 and 10), subsequently amended

by an Amendment Agreement (Ex. 14), and then set a closing
date by oral agreement for February 17, 1978 at the offices
of Rocky Mouritain Title (Rec. 348:18-25).

The evidence is

undisputed and the trial court held that at closing the plaintiffs had the funds to make the payment of $215,000.00 required
to be paid under the two agreements ($175,000.00 under Ex. 9
and $40,000.00 under Ex. 10).

This Supreme Court speaking in

Huck vs. Hayes pointed out that under the contract it was the
defendant-seller's responsibility to furnish good title to the
property to be conveyed and a title insurance policy evidenced
in such title.

This Court held in Huck vs. Hayes that such

obligation was a condition precedent to the seller's right to
demand payment from the purchaser where the Court said:
Inasmuch as under the contract the defendant's
to furnish good title and a
title insurance policy, the furnishing thereof
was a condition precedent to his right to demand payment from the purchaser.
r~sponsibility

It is fundamental that a party to a contract
should obtain no advantage for the fact that
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he is himself unable to perform. Since the
defendant had not come forth with the agreed
title insurance policy demonstrating that he
could convey a clear and marketable title as
of the proposed closing date, March 8, 1974,
he could neither demand payment by the plaintiff on that date, nor claim that the latter was
in default for failing to make the payment.
(Emphasis Added)
In the present case, the title report on the 105
acres (Ex. 17), being purchased under Exhibit 9, shows that
Cedar Hills Development Company had title only to the south
approximately 660 feet of said property and title to the
remaining portion is in the name of Keith Wagstaff.

The

title report, further shows the following clouds on the
title on the 105 acres:
(a)
Sale to Utah County for taxes for the
year of 1976, item 2.
(b)
Sale to Utah County for taxes for the
year 1976, item 3.
(c) An easement for a concrete ditch across
the property, item 5.
(d)

An easement for a concrete ditch, item 6.

(e) An overlap on part of the property by
virtue of a deed in the name of George Dale
Burgess and Ann Burgess, item 7.
(£)
A Judgment in favor of the State Tax
Commission of Utah against Cedar Hills
Development Company, item 9.

(g) An unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Contract between Keith Wagstaff as seller and
Doyle Barrett and c. Dale Murdock as buyers,
item 10.
(h)
Unrecorded Real Estate Contract between
Cedar Hills Investment Group as sellers and
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Associated Industrial Developers as buyers,
item 11.
The title report on the 37.75 acres

(Ex. 18),

being purchased under Exhibit 10, shows that the Federal Land
Bank holds an undivided one-half interest in all minerals,
Jay Ezra Adams and Effie W. Adams hold title to the South
1,110 feet, and Cedar Hills Development holds title to the
remainder.

The title report further shows the following

clouds on the title:
(a)
Sale to Utah County for taxes for the
year 1977, item 2.
(b)
Sale to Utah County for taxes for the
year 1976, item 3.
(c) An overlapping description and a deed to
James D. Harvey and Barbara S. Harvey as to an
overlap of the property, item 5.
(d)
A Deed of Trust by Associated Industrial
Developers to Zions First National Bank in the
amount of $225,000.00, item 6.
(e)
A Deed of Trust by Cedar Hills Development
Company to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan
dated December 28, 1977 (after the execution
of the agreement with the plaintiffs herein)
in the amount of $1,457,334.00, item 7.
(f)
A Judgment in favor of the State Tax
Commission of Utah against Cedar Hills Development Company in the amount of $227.75, item 8.
(g)
An unrecorded Real Estate Contract between
Jay Ezra Adams and Effie w. Adams as sellers,
and Doyle Barrett and C. Dale Murdock as
buyers, item 9.
(h)
The interest of Effie W. Adams, Trustee
of the Effie W. Adams Family Trust Agreement
by reason of a Quit Claim Deed dated December
12, 1977, item 12.
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~i)
The property is subject to right of
ingress and egress at all times for purpose
of mining, milling or extracting minerals
from the land, item 13.

The contracts entered into between the parties made
no exclusions or exceptions for other than conveyance of fee
simple absolute title to the buyers, title to be delivered
in accordance with the release provisions of the agreements
as payments were made.

Buyers had made payment of $25,000.00

on the 105 acres and $10,000.00 on the 37.75 acres as earnest
money (Rec. 435:17-20; 436:26-28).

Sellers made demand upon

the realtors and received the $35,000.00 on November 23, 1977
(Rec. 292:2-10; Ex.· 12).
At the time of closing, the buyers were to have
paid $175,000.00 on the 105 acres and $40,000.00 on the 37.75
acres, constituting $215,000.00 and, at that time were to
have obtained the fee simple absolute title, evidenced by a
policy of title insurance, on 13 acres out of the 105 acres
and 3 acres out of the 37.75 acres.
The testimony of Douglas Church, president of the
title company, and Exhibits 17 and 18, shows that at the time
of the proposed closing the defendants did not have clear
title to the property and could not produce clear title for
the closing (Rec. 551:8-11, 21-25; 512:11-22; 513:18-28;
514:6-21; 515:17-28; 516:5-8; 517:5-15; 554:8-9, 18-30; 573:3-8}.
There was no deed prepared as required by the contracts for the conveyance to the plaintiffs at the time of the
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closing of the 13 acres and the 3 acres, respectively (Rec.
515:16-28).
There was no release of mortgage from Prudential
Federal Savings and Loan nor Zions First National Bank.

The

company president attempted to secure documents to clear the
encumbrances but was unsuccessful.
Q. You said you contacted on your own the
lending institutions relative to obtaining
a release as to their deeds of trust. What
response did you get from them?
A. Most of the feed back from then was of a
vague nature.
I received some information
from one of the ladies in Salt Lake at
·Prudential; however, I received very little
satisfaction in the fact that we would be
getting a partial reconveyance of those.

Q. Now, when you say you got very little
satisfaction, what do you mean?

A.
I mean she indicated the amount, the
approximate amount but stated that she was
not sure whether they could be reconveyed
and she would refer me to -- I can't
remember his name, either one of the other
fellows in the office, and so forth and
basically just a run around is what I
picked up.
(Rec. 516:9-25)
The defendants themselves admitted that they had no deed prepared to convey title to the buyers as required by the contract
on the 13 and 3 acres, respectively; had obtained no release
of mortgage and did not have title to the property (Rec.
687:30; 688:1-7), testimony of Mr. Nixon:
Q. Were you able at that time to convey title
by Warranty Deed?
A.

No.
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Q.

Why not?

A.
Because of the underlying obligations and
mortgages on the property.

Q.

Did you have title?

A.

No.

(Rec. 687:30 to 688:7)

The Amended Agreement, paragraph No. 1, required
that the sellers transfer water rights to the City.

The

testimony of the agent for Cedar Hills Investment and Land
Company, Reed Nixon, the testimony of Mr. Malis and the testimany of Mr. Church, the title company representative, all
established that they did not and could not get the water
certificates until ~he underlying indebtedness of the seller,
Cedar Hills Investment and Land Company, upon all of the
properties had been paid.

(Rec. 683:17-27; 684:22-27)

The sellers could not deliver one-half (1/2) of the
mineral rights on the 37.75 acres, although the contract
called for conveyance of clear title to the property.

The

title report shows that as to the 37.75 acres, the Federal
Land Bank had an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the
mineral rights in the property.

There is no testimony that

sellers had any ability to or any contract for the securing of
said mineral rights.

Defendants could not deliver those

mineral rights and without the mineral rights, the plaintiffs
could not secure FHA financing on the houses to be constructed
on the property (Rec. 511:16-23; 574:3-8; 612:5-29).
The Amendment Agreement required that the sellers
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dedicate to the City "certain real property for necessary
access to Buyer's first release" on which preliminary plat
approval had been obtained.

Such transfer had not taken

place and, at the time of closing, no documents were presented
to dedicate said property to the City to provide the buyers
with access to the property.
The Earnest Money Contracts required the sellers to
provide the buyers with 42 hookups to the lagoon system owned
by the sellers.

The testimony is consistent through all

witnesses that the buyers were intending to build 42 homes on
the first released property to be conveyed at the time of
closing.

They had a bank commitment.for the construction

of said homes on condition that water and sewer connections
were provided.

The contracts required the hookups.

The

frustration of the intended closing meetings was primarily
caused by the refusal or inability of the sellers to deliver
the 42 hookups.

(Rec. 517:25-28; 548:18-27)

The defendants tried to excuse such failure to deliver the hookups, claiming such right belonged to the Town of
Cedar Hills, and have maintained that they were willing to
deliver "all that they could" in the way of hookups, but that
they did not have the power to deliver the hookups nor the
mineral rights.

This contention of defendants is untenable

since the defendants owned the lagoons and had refused to
transfer them to the town or even sign a lease on them (Testimony of Brian Harrison, Rec. 424:23-30).

However, in Smith vs.
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~'

(1977) 564 P.2d 771 the sellers, arguing against a

claim for damages for breach of the sellers agreeing to deliver
title, urged upon the Court that the Utah Court should accept
a good faith-bad faith distinction and that only out-of-pocket
loss should be awarded in cases of a good faith breach.

The

Supreme Court of Utah held that the rule followed by Utah in
a breach of contract by the vendor is that damages are to be
awarded for the breach of contract for the sale of the real
estate regardless of the good faith of or

ina~ility

to deliver

what was contracted to be delivered by the party in breach.
The Court ·reversed,. requiring the trial court to make a determination of the damages consistent with that opinion without
regard to the good faith-bad faith concept.
Thus, even if the seller, Cedar Hills Investment and
Land Company, was unable to deliver the 42 hookups as it had
contracted to do, unable to deliver the mineral rights as
it had contracted to do, unable to deliver water right,
or unable to convey title, their good faith or inability
to be able to perform does not furnish any release from its
responsibility to do so and its obligation to pay damages
for failing to do so.

Under the contract the sellers were to

furnish sufficient culinary water for the entire acreage and
the 42 hookups

(30 hookups for the 105 acres and 12 hookups

for the 37 acres).

Defendants now maintain that they could

not deliver the water shares until such time as the entire
contract by which they were purchasing the land had been

pai~
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off and the underlying indebtedness owed by Cedar Hills Investment and Land Company to the people from whom they purchased
the property had been paid.

They say this inability should

relieve them of the responsibility to deliver what was required
by the contracts and specifically provided by the Amendment
Agreement (Ex. 14) drafted by the seller, Mr. Malis.

As

pointed out in Smith vs. Warr, supra, good faith of the
sellers does not give any relief from the responsibility and
the obligation to pay damages· for failing to do so.
It is significant in this matter that the sellers,
having the obligation under the contract to deliver clear
title, release of mortgages, transfer of water rights and the
hookups for the sewer, provided no documentation sufficient to
carry out a closing at the time that Mr. Drivas came for the
purported purpose of closing.

Sellers' failure is strongly

pointed out in the testimony of Doug Church, the president of the
title company, who indicated in his testimony as follows:

Q. Now, on the date of the closing, the
scheduled closing, did you have the necessary
documents in your possession to conduct the
closing?
A.
I did not have all of the -- I could not
adequately pass title at that time.
There
would need to be some exceptions that would
affect the title that needed to be cleared
up before that could be done .
. . . title report which showed the Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley actually as a half -- as
being a fee title holder of one half of the
mineral rights and Jay Ezra Adams and Effie
W. Adams had a fee interest in a portion
of the property.
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Q. Would that mean, as you view it, the
south 1,110 feet was still titled in the
Adams?
A.
Yes, according to the chain of title, yes,
that's correct.

Q. Were you provided, in preparation for the
closing, were you provided with any documents
to clear up the title problems in connection
with that 37.75 acres?
A.

No, sir, I was not.

Q. Were you given any instructions to procure
any releases of Deeds of Trust or transfers by
deeds to clear up the title problems?
A.

No, sir, I was not . . .

Q. Did you have sufficient instruments in
your possession on February 17, 1978 on which
you could have made a closing and conveyance
of title and the issuance of a title policy
on those thirteen and three acres, respectively?
A.

Not completely, no, sir.

Q. Were any documents given to you or the
rJeans by which you could have obtained these
documents to give a clear title on those
acreages?
A.
Not at that time.
(Rec. 511:5-25; 512:11-14;
514:14-21; 515:29-30; 516:1-8)
The evidence clearly shows that the defendants were
in default under the contract, did not and were not able to
provide what they contracted to deliver at a time set for closing
by the parties, and the buyers, plaintiffs herein, were
ready, willing and able to close the transaction as contracted.
The ruling of the Court in Huck vs. Hayes, supra,
sets the guideline for the trial court.

It was error for the

trial court to hold the plaintiffs' failure to make an actual
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tender of the monies they had in preparation for the closing
(Rec. 554:26-30; 555:1-28) was a breach of the agreement.
In fact, the parties had made an offer in writing
to close the matter and make the payment which was $215,000.00
even after the intended closing date.

On February 23, 1978,

plaintiffs' counsel attempted to negotiate a resolution of the
problem of the 42 hookups to the lagoon system and in the last
paragraph in£ormed the defendants that plaintiffs were ready
to close and prepared to close the matter within 10 days {Ex. 42).
Under 78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a written
of fer to

clos~

the

mat~er

and make the payment by the plain-

tiffs is equivalent to an actual tender of money.

Under these

circumstances, the trial court erred in failing to hold that
the plaintiffs were ready, willing and able to perform under
the contract.

The trial court should have ruled that defen-

dants alone were in breach of the agreements.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED
PLAINTIFFS. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED .IN FAILING TO AWARD
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFFS
In the decision entered by the trial court, the
plaintiffs were awarded judgment against the defendants for
$35,000.00 with interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per
annum.

No attorney's fees or costs were awarded to either

party.

In entering the judgment, the trial court failed to

follow the Utah law with regard to measure of damages for
breach by the sellers of the land sale contract.

The circumstance
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now before the Court is that the vendee was ready, willing
and able to perform and appeared at the closing prepared to
close the transaction.
(a)

The vendor had:

made no preparations for the closing,

(b)
had not provided a clear title to the
title company to be conveyed at closing,
(c)
could not provide a policy of title
insurance showing clear title,
(d)
had no provisions for release of encumbrances,
(e)
had no documents for conveyance of the
property to be conveyed at the time of the
closing,
(f) "failed to transfer the water rights to
town, and
(g)
failed to dedicate the property to the
town to provide access to the subject property to be conveyed by the sellers to the
buyers.
Under such circumstances, this Court has spoken very clearly
as to the measure of damages to be applied by the trial court.
In 1959 in the case of Andreasen vs. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370,
335 P.2d 404

(1959), the Court in discussing the measure of

damages for breach of a land sale contract said at page 373:
The proper measure of damages would be
the difference between the defendant's
offer and the actual market value of
the property.
However, that issue was more specifically dealt with in 1962
in Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 579

(1962) where

the Court said at page 88:
The measure of damages where the vendor
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has breached a land sale contract is the
market value of the property at the
time of the breach less the contract
price to the vendee. . . {.Emphasis Added)
The Court further said:
Where a rule of law has been established
for the measurement of damages, it must
be followed by the finder of fact, and to
recover damages plaintiff must prove not
only that she has suffered a loss, but must
also prove the extent and the amount thereof.
Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based
on the value of the property there must be
proof of its value or evidence of such facts
as will warrant a finding of value with
reasonable certainty.
Id. at 88.
The evidence presented in Bunnell v. Bills, supra, was the
plaintiff's opinion-as to the value of the property.

The case

was then affirmed as to that part of the decision finding
that the parties had entered into a binding contract and that
the defaulting vendor became liable in damages for the breach.
It was reversed and submitted back to the trial court to
have further hearing to determine the market value of the
property.
In the case now before the Court, plaintiffs presented their evidence as to the market value of the property
at the time of the breach on February 17, 1978 and to that
end, plaintiffs called as a witness Steven Charles Blankenship,
a real estate appraiser.

Counsel for the defendants stipulated

to Mr. Blankenship's qualifications as a qualified appraiser
(Rec.

631) where counsel said at lines 6-9:
Mr. Wilson:
Excuse me if I may interrupt.
I am personally acquainted with Mr. Blanken-
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ship and I will stipulate he is qualified
as an appraiser and I have used him on
several occasions if that will save time.
The property, both the 105 acres and the 37.75 acres, were
appraised using two methods of appraisal, the market data
approach and the development cost approach (Rec. 631:19-22).
Mr. Blankenship appraised the property at $15,500.00 per
acres on the date of the breach using the market data approach,
and a value of $15,600.00 per acre using the development cost
approach.

The appraiser then testified that the value of the

property using the lower of the two appraisal methods was, at
the time of the breach of February 17, 1978, $2,212,000.00
(Rec. 637:14-18).

The purchase price of the two properties

combined was $1,934,675.00 (Exs. 9 and 10, Rec. 638:18-22).
The difference between the purchase price to the plaintiffs
for the property and the market value on the date of the
breach was $277,325.00.

No rebuttal evidence as to such

value was presented by defendants and in fact, the testimony
of Mr. Blankenship was corroborated by Mr. Reed Nixon, a witness
called by the defendants.

In his testimony regarding pro-

perties sold by the defendants, Mr. Nixon was asked by his
own counsel:

Q. What was the sales price and what was the
sales price at which those lots were to be
sold to Mr. Jensen?
A.

Twelve Five.

Q.

Twelve Thousand Five Hundred per lot?
\,

A.

\

Yes.
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Recross-examination, question by Mr. Jeffs of Mr. Nixon:
Q. Mr. Nixon, that is the figure that Mr.
Blankenship used in his appraisal, was it not?
A.
That is correct.
710:20-29; 711:2-5)

(Rec. 705:24-JO; 706:1-16;

The testimony of the defendants' own witnesses of
actual sales corroborated the figures used by the appraiser
in determining the value of the property on the date of the
breach of contract.
In 1977, in the

cas~

of Smith vs. Warr, 56A P.2d

771 (1977), the Court said at page 772:
The measure of damages where the vendor has
breached a land sale contract is the market
value of the property at the time of the
breach less the contract price to the vendee.
The rule followed by Utah is that benefitof-the-bargain damages are to be awarded
for breach of contract for the sale of real
estate, regardless of the good faith of the
party in breach. We therefore reverse, and
remand to the District Court for a determination of damages consistent with this opinion,
for an award of reasonable attorney's fees
as required by the contract, and for costs
below in the discretion of the Court. . .
(Emphasis added)
The Court's denial of plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees
of $9,478.00 (stipulated as to amount, Rec. 648:7-15) was in
accordance with Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, and Smith vs. Warr,
supra.

The trial court should have awarded as the benefit-of-

the-bargain to the vendees, the difference between market
value and the buyers' purchase price of $277,325.00, and in
addition the plaintiffs should have been reimbursed the $35,00Q.00
paid upon the contract and the attorney's fees in the amount
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of $9,478.00.

In Smith vs. Warr, supra, the vendor contended

that because they were unable to deliver what they had contracted to deliver, the Court should adopt a good faith-bad
faith rule and that the District Court should have awarded to
the buyers only their out-of-pocket losses.

The Court specifi-

cally rejected the sellers' contention that benefit-of-the-bargain
damages have only been awarded in Utah when the breach was in
bad faith.

The Court said that that contention is not well

founded and cited Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, in support thereof.
It went on to say at page 722:
[T]he rule followed by Utah is that benefit-ofthe-bargain damages are to be awarded for
breach of contract for sale of real estate,
regardless of the good faith of the party
in breach.
The Court reversed the trial court decision, and ordered it
remanded to the District Court for the determination of the
damages consistent with the rule on the measure of damages
for loss of bargain and for an award of reasonable attorney's
fees as required by the contract.

In 1978, this Court again

in Beckstrom vs. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 at page 523 restated
the entitlement of the vendee to the market value of the
property less the amount the vendee agreed to pay for the
property.

The Court again cited Bunnell vs. Bills, supra,

Smith vs. Warr, supra, and Andreasen vs. Hansen, supra, in
support of such measure of damages.
In addition to their loss of bargain, the plaintiffs
have suffered their expenses incurred as a result of entering
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into the contract and the subsequent breach of the agreements
by the defendants.

Those items of damages are uncontested and

include:
(a)
$35, 000 .,QQ paid upon the earnest money
contracts (Rec. 560:21-26) which money was
obtained from the real,estate brokers by demand
of the defendants within a few days after the
earnest money contracts were signed.
(Ex. 12).
(b)
The engineering costs expended on the
project of $11,761.40 (Rec. 555:6-19, the
undisputed and unrefuted testimony of Dick
Bastian).
(c)
$2,500.00 paid as an annexation fee
to the town of Cedar Hills to annex the
defendants property into the town (Rec. 563:8-13).
(d) Attorney's fees of $9,478.00 (stipulation
of counsel, Rec. 648:7-15).
Plaintiffs further submitted testimony to the trial
court as to the time and effort spent by Mr. Bastian and Mr.
Taylor in the furtherance of this project.

Plaintiffs-appellants

acknowledge that such expenses could be properly excluded by
the trial court.

However, the loss of bargain defendants paid

under the contract, out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of entering into the contract and the
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs were not discretionary with
the trial court.

The trial court having determined that

defendants were unable to convey a correct title or deliver
that which they contracted to deliver, plaintiffs-appellants
were entitled as a matter of right to be awarded such damages.
The proved, established and unrebutted evidence discloses
that plaintiffs were entitled to an award of damages:
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(a)

Benefit-of-the-bargain

(b)

Payment on contract

35,000.00

( c)

Out-of-pocket expenses

11,761.40

(d)

Attorney's fees

$277,325.00

9,478.00

The trial court misapplied the Utah law .in failing
to award plaintiffs damages in said amount of

$33~,564.40.

The trial court, apparently concluding both parties
were in default, attempted to avoid an inequity by not allowing
defendants to retain the $35,000.00 paid upon the earnest
money contracts.
a suit for· damages

This, however, was not an equity case.
~rom

It was

the time that the parties stipulated

that the plaintiffs might withdraw their specific performance,
it being obvious that sellers could not convey title and deliver that which was contracted for.

From that point on it

was an action at law for damages for breach of contract and
the trial court was required by the decision of Smith vs. Warr,
supra, and Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, upon a showing of the
value of the property by competent evidence, to make an award
for the loss of bargain.

The Court should also have made an

award for reimbursement of the monies paid under the contract,
attorney's fees provided by the contracts and an award to the
plaintiffs for their out-of-pocket expenses as a result of
entering into the contracts and the subsequent breach by the
defendants.
Based upon the evidence now in and before the Court,
this Court should make the appropriate award for damages as
delineated herein.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR FURNISHING OF SEWER HOOKUPS WAS WAIVED
Plaintiffs entered into the purchase agreement for
142.75 acres of property for the purpose of developing the
same as residential building lots.

The fact that it was

purchased for development is evidenced by the contracts themselves, which provided that the contracts were contingent upon
the securing of approval of the annexation of the town of
Cedar Hills and plat approval within 90 days.

Those Exhibits

are in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

The

purchasers, as developers of the property, would have to
provide, in order to go forward with the development, culinary
water and sewage hookups in order to be able to build the
homes as is shown by the testimony of Mr. Bastian (Rec. 573)
wherein the question was asked (beginning at line 12):

Q. Mr. Bastian, why were you so insistent at
the time of the projected closing of having a
letter corrunitting the forty two hookups from
Cedar Hills Development Company?
A. Without sewer hookups or any water hookups,
we could not get, No. 1, plat approval No. 2,
loan corrunitment; No. 3, could not transfer
title to any of the lots I hoped to develop.
Without the culinary water and the sewer hookups, the buyers
were not receiving what they had contracted to purchase.

They

were not given clear title to the property, and they were not
getting the water and sewer hookups which were a necessary and
fundamental part of the purchase agreement.

The land without
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the capability of development was useless to them and did not
warrant the purchase price in excess of $13,500.00 per acre.
These requirements for water and sewer hookups were not waived
as shown by the evidence presented to the trial

cour~a

letter

from the seller's real estate agents to sellers indicating in
paragraph No. 4 that the development company needed to provide
a letter authorizing the use of the 42 hookups from the lagoon
system owned by the development company to authorize the
buyers to go forward with the project.

(Ex. 13)

On the date

of the closing, the realty agent, Richard LaFrance, obtained
authorization from the Division of Health for increased commitment for the lagoons owned by the development company sufficient
to include the additional 42 hookups required by the buyers
and which were an integral part of the contract (Ex. 15).
The authorization requested in the closing meeting, which
would have met that requirement under the contract, was
never given.

Mr. Bastian testified:
Q. Now, going forward to the conference.for
closing purposes, will you tell us what you
said, what Mr. Carson or Taylor said, and Mr.
Drivas said relative to the same subject matter, the hookups the water and the conveyance
of title? (Mr. Jeffs)
A.
In the conversation and in previous written
documents we had aqreed to accept the existing
water shares that the sellers now owned in the
amount of one hundred and twenty-three shares,
I believe, to be dedicated to Cedar Hills to
give them the bargaining power in obtaining
water for our subdivision in the future; that
it was imperative that we have forty-two of the
sewer hookups that have already been promised
set aside and dedicated to this plan so we could
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get F.H.A. approval and develop the subdivision.
Also, mention was made of the title to the
thirty seven acres to the effect that part of
the mineral rights had been deeded off and
without the mineral rights, F.H.A. would not
give lending or approval.
Q.

What did Mr. Drivas respond to those matters?

A.
I don't recall.
I don't know that that's
become an issue.
The main issue was the water
shares and the sewer hookups.
(Rec. 553: 12-30;
554:1-9)
The agreement on the sewer hookups had not been waived, as
is demonstrated by Mr. Bastian's testimony.
Q.
Do you know the reason why the closing did
not go forward on the 17th?

A.
It Wasn't ready to close.
The things, the
personal and real property that I had contracted
to buy were not in evidence and no vehicle had
been provided for their forthcoming.
Q. What do you mean by "no vehicle was provided
for their forthcoming"?

A. The sewer hookups, no documentation either
from Cedar Hills or from the owners allowing
me to use them on the forty-two lots that I
had contracted to use them on.
No water shares
were in evidence or forthcoming to be dedicated
to Cedar Hills City to allow me to obtain the
additional water connections that I needed.
I
had contracted for both of these, real and personal property.
(Rec. 554:10-24)
On February 10, after the Amendment Agreement was written, Mr.
McNeilly, acting in behalf of the selling agents, Global Enterprises, wrote to Mr. Reed Nixon, the agent of Cedar Hills
Development Company (Ex. 20), requesting the authorizations
of the hookups and suggesting that if they could obtain the
authorization from the town of Cedar Hills and the Department
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of Health officials this would meet the buyers' requirements.
Despite such requests in writing by sellers' own
agent and the fact that the selling agent, Mr. Richard LaFrance,
produced at the closing meeting the authorization from the State
Health Department for the increased use of the lagoons, nevertheless, Mr. Drivas, an agent sent by the sellers to attend
the closing, refused to provide the authorization for the use
of the hookups.

The testimony of Mr. Bastian shows that no

waiver was given:

Q. And I don't want you to give me all two
hours of discussion, but can you tell me those
things that Mr. Drivas said relative to going
forth with the closing?
A.
I
my 42
can't
have,

wanted a guarantee that I would get
sewer hookups.
Mr. Drivas said, 'I
give you what I do not have. What I
I give to you.'

Q.
Thereafter at the meeting was Mr. Drivas
asked to sign an instrument or to give a letter
committing those hookups?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What was his response to that request?

A.
That it wasn't within his power to do so,
that that would have to come from the City of
Cedar Hills.
(Rec. 548:14-27)
In this particular situation, the sewage lagoons in
use by the town were owned by the development company, the
sellers in this matter; the town had been making considerable
efforts to gain a lease or conveyance of the sewage lagoons
so that it might have control of them; the sellers had com-
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mitted to deliver 42 hookups to the lagoons as a part of the
property being purchased; and the defendants-sellers come to
the closing meeting to obtain their $215,000.00 without any
preparations for the closing and refused to give their
authorization to the use of their lagoons.

In the face

of such testimony and behavior, it is an incorrect ruling by
the trial court that the plaintiffs waived their right to receive the 42 sewer lagoon hookups as an integral part of this
purchase.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT EB.RED IN NOT ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST
ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPERS, INC. AND NEAR EAST
TECHNOLOGICAL SERVICES, LIMITED, INC.
In this matter, plaintiffs brought the suit against
Cedar Hills Development Company, which company has subsequently
changed its name to Cedar Hills Land and Investment Company,
(statement of defense counsel Rec. 660:8-30; 661:1-16),
Associated Industrial Developers, a California corporation,
Near East Technological Services, Limited, a California
corporation, William A. Malis and George C. Drivas.

At the

close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court dismissed
William A. Malis and George C. Drivas from the action (Rec.
651:18-28) and dismissed Wincor Developrrle-nt (Rec. 652:3-4).
Cedar Hills Development Company is a partnership, its principal
officer is William A. Malis

(Rec. 277:7-11) and its partners

are Associated Industrial Developers and Near East Technological
Services, Inc.

(Rec. 277:16-19, Rec. 277:28-30, Rec. 278:6-19,
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Rec. 278:27-30, Rec. 279:1).
In determining that Cedar Hills Development Company,
now Cedar Hills Land and Investment Company, partnership was
liable, the Court should have a.lso entered judgment against
Associated Industrial Developers, Inc. and Near East Technological Services, Limited, Inc., the corporate partners in
Cedar Hills Development Company and the principals obligated
for the debts incurred in the name of the partnership.
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly ruled that the defendants
could not clos.e _the . transaction or deliver that which they had
contracted to deliver, i.e. good title free of encumbrances
on a release schedule provided by the parties agreement.

The

trial court further correctly ruled that the plaintiffs had
the ability and the funds available for the closing.
Based upon the trial court's misassumption that the
technicality of tender made both parties equally at fault in
the transaction, the trial court incorrectly ruled that plaintiffs were only entitled to a refund of the $35,000.00 earnest
money they had paid upon these contracts.
This Court should now apply its previous pronouncements .of the measure of damages.

It should make the determina-

tion of damages, which are all supported in the record and
unrefuted and correct the judgment of the trial court.

This

Court should award to the plaintiffs the loss of bargain in the
amount of $277,325.00, the $35,000.00 paid upon the contract,
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engineering costs incurred as a result of entering into the
contracts in the amount of $11,716.40, annexation fee in the
amount of $2,500.00 and the stipulated amount of attorney's
fees of $9,478.00.
Plaintiffs, the buyers in this transaction, respectfully request the Court to enter its amended judgment in
accordance with the law and with the evidence.
Dated and signed this 25th day of June, 1980.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:
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